During that hearing it was learned that U. Department of Commerce that were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and missile delivery system development programs.
During that hearing it was learned that U. There, they related details of unexplained events that took place during the Persian Gulf War which they believed to be chemical warfare agent attacks. After these unexplained events, many of the veterans present reported symptoms consistent with exposure to a mixed agent attack.
Then, on July 29,the Czech Minister of Defense announced that a Czechoslovak chemical decontamination unit had detected the chemical warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during the early phases of the Gulf War.
They had attributed the detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical warfare agent production facilities. In SeptemberSenator Riegle released a staff report on this issue and introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year National Defense Authorization Act that provided preliminary funding for research of the illnesses and investigation of reported exposures.
When this first staff report was released by Senator Riegle, the estimates of the number of veterans suffering from these unexplained illnesses varied from hundreds, according to the Department of Defense, to thousands, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs.
It is now believed that tens of thousands of U. Hundreds and possibly thousands of servicemen and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward for fear of losing their jobs and medical care. These Gulf War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal congestion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes, sores, and a number of other symptoms.
They began experiencing these multiple symptoms during and after -- often many months after -- their tour of duty in the Gulf. A number of the veterans who initially exhibited these symptoms have died since returning from the Gulf. The scope and urgency of this crisis demands an appropriate response.
This investigation into Gulf War Syndrome, which was initiated by the Banking Committee under the direction of Chairman Riegle, has uncovered a large body of evidence linking the symptoms of the syndrome to the exposure of Gulf War participants to chemical and biological warfare agents, chemical and biological warfare pre-treatment drugs, and other hazardous materials and substances.
Since the release of the first staff report on September 9,this inquiry has continued. Thousands of government officials, scientists, and veterans have been interviewed or consulted, and additional evidence has been compiled. This report will detail the findings of this ongoing investigation.
Since the Banking Committee began its inquiry, the position of the Department of Defense regarding the possible causes of Gulf War Syndrome has altered only when challenged with evidence that is difficult to dispute. Yet, despite the vast resources of the Department of Defense, several independent and congressional inquiries with limited resources continue to uncover additional evidence of hazardous exposures and suspicious events.
The Department of Defense, when first approached regarding this issue by Committee staff, contended that there was no evidence that U. However, during a telephone interview on September 7, with Walter Reed Army Medical Center commander Major General Ronald Blanck, Committee staff was informed that the issue of chemical and biological warfare agent exposure had not been explored because it was the position of "military intelligence" that such exposures never occurred.
Then, during a November 10, press briefing at the Pentagon, the Department of Defense acknowledged that the Czech government did detect chemical agents in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. After analyzing the results of the Czech report, the Department of Defense concluded that the detections were unrelated to the "mysterious health problems that have victimized some of our veterans.
For instance, Seabees serving to the south and east of the detection site have complained of persistent health problems; but according to the Pentagon, the wind was blowing in the other direction at the time of the detections and the concentrations were too low to do harm over that kind of a distance.
The fact is, no one has ever suggested that there was a link between the Czech detections and what occurred during the early morning hours of January 19, near the Port of Jubayl. These two events will be described in detail in Chapter 2.
Former Defense Secretary Aspin said at the briefing that this incident could not have been from the Coalition bombings of the Iraqi chemical weapons facilities because the winds were blowing to the northwest.
Yet according to available Soviet documents, the dispersal of chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by other factors in addition to surface wind direction and velocity, such as topography, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient, and atmospheric humidity.
These factors all contribute to the size and type of dispersal that will be observed. According to a knowledgeable source, the Czechs believed that the detections were caused by the weather inversion which occurred that day January 19, as the weather front moved southward.
The Czechoslovak chemical detection unit reported this information to U. Nonetheless, at the November 10, briefing, the Department of Defense admitted that the Czech detections were believed to be valid. The Department of Defense failed to disclose that the Czechoslovak chemical detection team also detected yperite HD that morning.
The presence of both of these agents in such close proximity could only reasonably be the result of one of two possibilities: Defense Department officials, having had possession of the Czech report for over a month, were at a loss to explain the chemical mustard agent detected by the Czechoslovak chemical detection team in the Saudi desert near King Khalid Military City on January 24, This despite the fact that both the Czechs and French claim that this detection was reported to U.
These statements, heretofore only reported in the press, have been confirmed by a member of the U. Army chemical detection unit who trained with the Czechoslovak chemical detection unit near King Khalid Military City.USIP was established by Congress in as an independent institution devoted to the nonviolent prevention and mitigation of deadly conflict abroad.
Early relations. Political relations between Persia (now Iran) and the United States began when the Shah of Persia, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Persia's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan Shirazi, to Washington D.C. in In , Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy .
When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson's Siberian Disaster [Carl J. Richard] on iridis-photo-restoration.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. In a little-known episode at the height of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson dispatched thousands of American soldiers to Siberia.
Carl J. Richard convincingly shows that Wilson’s original intent was to enable Czechs and anti-Bolshevik Russians. Blog. Fragile States Fail Their Citizens and Threaten Global Security. Both the scale and the complexity of state fragility today are unprecedented, and extremists are .
SECTION. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. The military budget is the portion of the discretionary United States federal budget allocated to the Department of Defense, or more broadly, the portion of the budget that goes to any military-related iridis-photo-restoration.com military budget pays the salaries, training, and health care of uniformed and civilian personnel, maintains arms, equipment and facilities, funds operations, and develops and.