Our true character is revealed by normal, consistent, everyday attitudes and behavior, not by self-conscious words or deeds or rare acts of moral courage.
Trading of reputation decreases cooperation in games with stochastic end but increases cooperation in fixed-length games. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean, clustered on group to account for non-independence of observations from within one group.
Discussion Our experiments show that the trading of reputation can have a negative or positive impact on the level of cooperation, depending on the details of the setting.
In settings with stochastic end, the level of cooperation in the experiments with trading is substantially lower than in the experiments without trading. Such an effect is not expected from our theoretical analysis that shows that cooperative equilibria exist in both games with and without trading.
Several factors might contribute to the adverse effects of trading. First, in games with trading, participants might have a lower intrinsic motivation to cooperate. A third reason is that when reputation is mispriced in the market, defection is subsidized. If reputation is over-priced, as is the case at the beginning of our experiments, participants have a strong incentive to sell their good reputation.
This increases the number of participants in a bad reputation, and thereby subsequently decreases the level of cooperation. Similarly, under-pricing also subsidizes defection, because participants can profit by defecting in the PD and then re-buying a good reputation see the electronic supplementary material.
Interestingly, we observe under-pricing in many of the groups towards the end of our experiment. The reasons for this under-pricing are unclear. Potential factors that might contribute include risk aversion participants might prefer a guaranteed payoff from the market over an uncertain payoff from the PDan incorrect perception of the continuation probability of the game towards the end of the experiment, and a hesitancy to trade owing to the mechanisms similar to those behind the no-trade theorem [ 27 ].
Exploring these issues further is an important area for future study. While trading reputation is harmful in settings with stochastic end, our experiments and theoretical analyses suggest that trading can also be beneficial for the functioning of a reputation system, as, for example, in fixed-length games where new players keep entering as old players are leaving, or where a suitable market maker is moderating the trading.
Thus, our results can provide guidance for designing and improving reputation systems, particularly in the context of the Internet.
Consider, for example, the system used by an online marketplace such as eBay to evaluate sellers. In such a reputation system, a seller who knows he will exit the market soon has little incentive to invest into providing a satisfactory service; while a new seller without a history of transactions is likely to initially make less profitable trades [ 5 ].
The trading of reputation could help in both cases: It maintains incentives to be cooperative for sellers that intend to leave, and at the same time helps new sellers get into profitable business. In these systems, one can only gain a good reputation through an interaction with a reputable counter-party.
Two individuals with bad reputation can never gain a good reputation from interacting with each other. Such strict reputation systems have a substantial advantage: However, they face a challenge when starting off: If players begin with a bad reputation, then it is very difficult to subsequently establish a high frequency of players with good reputation, and thus it is difficult to reach a high level of cooperation.
The trading of reputation may help to jump-start such a strict system. Further theoretical and experimental analysis is required to investigate such a mechanism. For most people, earning and maintaining a good reputation seems to provide an intrinsic, instinctively satisfying motivation to do good [ 28 — 30 ].
But a good reputation also comes with explicit material value, which might explain why our emotions around reputation have emerged in the context of biological and cultural evolution. This explicit material value is of relevance in many real world economic situations.
Credit and driving history can be seen as a part of ones reputation:Reputation = Theme The central theme of one's identity plays a significant part in the plot and the characters in Beowulf.
Each character, from Beowulf to Grendel, have a reputation that correlates to their place in society. For example, Beowulf stands as a great warrior who came from a great line of royalty. This gives him a good reputation.
Reputation plays a central role in human societies. Empirical and theoretical work indicates that a good reputation is valuable in that it . "In this truly splendid, magisterial study, Carpenter thoroughly documents and narrates the FDA's struggle with the certainties of science, the uncertainties of politics, and the requirements of reputation, an asset that simultaneously granted the agency autonomy and then took it away through ever-increasing expectations of performance.".
CEPR organises a range of events; some oriented at the researcher community, others at the policy commmunity, private sector and civil society. This is the group discussion on "Influence of Online Social Networks on our Youth".
— The most comprehensive (nearly quotations) yet selective collection of insightful quotations on CHARACTER, REPUTATION & CHARACTER EDUCATION compiled by Michael Josephson who highlighted his favorites in bold.