The first aspect of the substantive relief sought is the setting aside of the resolution. The former entitles an affected person 4 to bring an application to set aside a resolution. The latter entitles a court to grant such an application.
The learned judge did so without the application having been formally set down and without hearing the parties. It was his understanding that this was the procedure required by rule 18 ehis reasoning being that it was not his function but that of the President of the Constitutional Court, in terms of rule 18 i ito grant the leave to appeal.
In this respect the learned judge erred.
Although rule 18 i ii provides that applications for leave to appeal may be dealt with summarily without hearing oral or written argument other than that contained in the application itself, it is clear from the context that this latter provision relates to the decision by the President and not to the grant of the certificate by the judge or court a quo.
The purpose of rule 18 e certification is to assist in ensuring that appeals are not heard by the Constitutional Court which are not of substance, or which cannot be dealt with and disposed of by the Constitutional Court because of the insufficiency of the evidence, or which have no reasonable prospect of success.
Apart from the fact that the person in whose favour the decision has been given in the court a quo has an interest in the granting of the certificate and is entitled to be heard on that ground alone, proper argument is important to ensure that the objects of certification are achieved. Where, however, a matter comes directly to this Court from a Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court it would greatly assist this Court in dealing with a new and complex point of constitutional law if it had the benefit of the views of the Supreme Court issuing the certificate, in addition to any judgment previously given in the case.
We have given due consideration to his written argument. In addition, however, Mr Munnik tendered a bundle of documents on which he sought to rely testimonially in his argument.
Save to the extent that any of the disputed factual averments might be so notorious as to justify the Court taking judicial notice thereof, none of the material falls within the provisions of rule 34 1 and is accordingly not admitted. The Human Rights Commission brought no application for condonation in this regard.
The interim Constitution imposes on it extensive duties, to be executed in a variety of ways, to further respect for and the observance and protection of fundamental rights.
As an amicus curiae it can be expected to play an important role, in appropriate circumstances, in the work of this Court but it does not, by virtue of the Constitution or other statutory provision, enjoy any privileged position and its admission as amicus in any particular case must therefore be governed by rule 9.
Moreover the written argument which it lodged did not raise any substantially new contentions which might have been useful for the Court.
Under these circumstances the Court declined to permit the Human Rights Commission to address argument to it. In considering the United States authorities he pointed out that while the Supreme Court had recognised a claim for constitutional damages, this remedy had grown out of the peculiarities intrinsic to United States jurisprudence and provided little real guidance.
Clearly punishment and deterrence are functions of the criminal law, not the law of delict. Section 7 4 a of the interim Constitution establishes a separate cause of action, a public law action directed against the state, based on the infringement of a fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 3.
The objectives of the law of delict differ fundamentally from those of constitutional law. The primary purpose of the former is to regulate relationships between private parties whereas the latter, to a large extent, aims at protecting the Chapter 3 rights of individuals from state intrusion. Similarly the purpose of a delictual remedy differs fundamentally from that of a constitutional remedy.
The common law remedies are not directed to the achievement of the first three of these objectives and the common law should not be distorted by requiring it to perform these functions and fulfil the purposes of constitutional law.
Hence the necessity, so the argument concludes, for a specific and separate public law constitutional damages remedy. The interim Constitution is the supreme law. It confers rights on persons and tells them that they may look to the courts for the protection and enforcement of such rights.
It is left to the courts to decide what would be appropriate relief in any particular case. If it is necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these all important rights. Particularly in the new legal order introduced by the interim Constitution, a judgment on the construction of a provision such as this is of concern not only to the immediate litigants in the case but also to all other persons whose Chapter 3 rights might have been or might be infringed; indeed it has implications for constitutional litigation generally.
In the present case it is essential to place the issue, narrow as it may be, in its correct jurisprudential context, both nationally and internationally. The issue is limited to constitutional damages.
Plaintiff sought no non-pecuniary relief whether by way of prohibitory or mandatory interdict or otherwise. Nothing in this judgment must therefore be construed as foreclosing any future consideration of any of these or other remedies as constituting appropriate relief in the circumstances of a particular case.
In order to avoid tedious repetition, the nature and the content of the remedy will be considered together when evaluating the foreign authorities.
Second, it is to be observed that remedies for constitutional infringement arise from basically two sources, the relief provided by section of the Civil Rights Act,  and constitutional damages based directly on the Constitution.
Third, it must be borne in mind that claims in tort fall within the jurisdiction of state courts. Consistent with the availability of punitive damages in ordinary tort suits in the United States, punitive damages against officials in their personal capacities are, in the appropriate circumstances, available in section actions.Part IV.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 29 CFR Parts and [Docket No. R] RIN AB Occupational Injury and Illness Recording and Reporting Requirements. a number of factors that may cause in effective implementation of training programs in parastatal organization; but can mainly be grouped into two: First, Organization factors such as, lack of training needs analysis, lack of sensitization of employees on existence of.
Webinar on Applying for Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (2 May , am - pm New York Time) In preparation for the 1 June deadline to apply for consultative status with ECOSOC, the NGO Branch is pleased to invite interested NGOs to an informational session about the application process.
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According to Aderibigbe (), monetary policy is a transmission mechanism which operates policy through the effects of interest of credit on economic agents which respond to different yields of various financial assets, level of aggregates demand, exchange rate overall economic activities.